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Original Article
Unveiling Naturalization
A Multilevel Study on Minority Proportion, Conservative
Ideologies, and Attitudes Toward the Muslim Veil
Nicole Fasel, Eva G. T. Green, and Oriane Sarrasin
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Abstract. Anti-Muslim attitudes are widespread in Western countries, especially among conservative individuals. Yet, the Muslim veil
sparks controversy across the ideological spectrum, potentially resulting in unwillingness to naturalize Muslim immigrants. Living in
culturally diverse contexts is likely to affect how ideologies relate to anti-veil attitudes. This study examined the interplay between
individual- and community-level ideologies and minority proportion in explaining anti-veil attitudes. Multilevel analyses with Swiss World
Values Survey data (N = 1,006; 125 municipalities) revealed that individual-level conservatism and conservative ideological climates
increased anti-veil attitudes. Minority proportion in a municipality (i.e., proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks representing the largest
Muslim groups) shaped the impact of conservative ideologies on both levels: Stronger anti-veil attitudes were found in highly conservative
communities when minority proportion was high rather than low, whereas low rather than high minority proportion strengthened anti-veil
attitudes for nonconformist individuals and in progressive communities. This research highlights the need to simultaneously examine
conservative ideologies and immigrant presence to understand host societies’ views of immigrants’ cultural practices.
Keywords: anti-Muslim attitudes, conservative ideologies, minority proportion, immigration, multilevel analysis
In recent years, Muslims have been the center of public,
media, and political debates on immigration and naturaliza-
tion in Western countries (Sniderman & Hagendoorn,
2007). In the Netherlands, anti-Muslim discourse has con-
tributed to the electoral success of the far-right Party for
Freedom (Verkuyten, 2013). In Switzerland, anti-Muslim
referenda campaigns such as the ban of minarets have
received tremendous public support (Fetzer & Soper,
2012). In parallel, events such as 9/11 or the Madrid bomb-
ings have drawn negative media attention to Muslim immi-
grants associating them with security threats and terrorism
(Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). The Muslim veil – portrayed
as an emblem of oppression toward women, undermining
individual autonomy and conflicting with a secular state –
has polarized feminist intellectuals and liberal politicians
(Wallach Scott, 2007). This polemic discourse is likely to
provide a fertile ground for anti-veil attitudes across the
ideological spectrum.
The Muslim veil is often perceived as a symbol of
unwillingness to assimilate and adopt the norms and cus-
toms of Western host societies (van der Noll, 2010). Con-
sidering the veil an obstacle to naturalization thus reflects
a refusal to include Muslims displaying their religious
membership within the symbolic boundaries of the national
ingroup. Such attitudes are likely to be anchored in conser-
vative ideologies endorsed by individuals and shared within
the ideological climates in which they are expressed. Living
in culturally diverse contexts where everyday encounters
with Muslims are frequent is likely to shape how such ide-
ologies relate to anti-veil attitudes. This paper uses a mul-
tilevel approach to examine across Swiss municipalities
the hitherto ignored interplay between conservative ideolo-
gies and the proportion of the largest Muslim groups (i.e.,
ex-Yugoslavs and Turks) in explaining anti-veil attitudes.
Conservative Ideologies on Multiple
Levels
Ideologies are understood as systems of beliefs and values
regarding ideal societal arrangements or sociopolitical
issues, such as immigration (Cohrs, 2012). Insofar as
the maintenance of status quo and the avoidance of
insecurity and threat are core features of conservative ide-
ologies (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), they
have been shown to underlie anti-immigrant attitudes
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(Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010).1 Because ideologies are not only
endorsed by individuals but represent essential features of
communities and larger societies, an appropriate conceptu-
alization of conservative ideologies needs to consider multi-
ple levels of analysis.
On the individual level, conservative ideologies
anchored in values related to conformity to ingroup norms,
protection of customs and traditions, and concern for secu-
rity and social order (Schwartz, 1992) have been shown to
trigger anti-immigrant prejudice (Davidov & Meuleman,
2012). In a comprehensive study examining the impact of
values, prejudice, and religiosity on anti-veil attitudes
among the Belgian host society, Saroglou, Lamkaddem,
Van Pachterbeke, and Buxant (2009) found that security
values persistently predicted negative representations of
and opposition toward the Muslim veil. This link was
explained by Muslims being regularly associated with ter-
rorism. Tradition values were linked to positive representa-
tions of the Muslim veil. Perceiving the veil as a tradition
may indeed elicit sympathy among individuals valuing tra-
dition. However, in a recent study on attitudes toward
Muslims’ civil liberties in the German public sphere, secu-
rity, tradition, and conformity values predicted opposition
to the Muslim veil (van der Noll, 2013). Individuals low
on conservative ideologies, in turn, were found to exhibit
more liberal and tolerant attitudes toward Muslims (Giugni
& Morariu, 2010; see Velasco Gonzles, Verkuyten,
Weesie, & Poppe, 2008 for similar effects of multicultural
ideologies).
The ideological climates (Green & Staerkl, 2013;
Sarrasin et al., 2012) in which individuals live provide a
framework of values, rules, and expectations that guide
individuals’ attitudes toward societal phenomena such as
immigrants (Deaux, 2006; Moscovici, 1988; Schwartz,
2006). Indeed, conservative ideological climates are charac-
terized by values and beliefs that support societal status quo
(Staerkl, Clmence, & Spini, 2011). Conservative ideolog-
ical climates of a nation or community depicted by stricter
immigration policy (Weldon, 2006; for anti-veil attitudes,
see van der Noll, 2010), conservative referenda results
(Sarrasin et al., 2012), or right-wing party presence
(Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006) have been
shown to foster exclusionary immigration attitudes, while
progressive ideological climates characterized by tolerant
norms generally yielded the opposite effect. Further, con-
servative ideological climates also have tangible political
consequences. For example, conservative ideological cli-
mates have been related to lower naturalization rates across
Swiss municipalities (Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013;
Helbling, 2010b), disadvantaging first and foremost indi-
viduals from Muslim countries.
Minority Proportion and Exclusionary
Attitudes
Attitude formation is affected by individuals’ everyday
experiences of the intergroup context in which they live.
The proportion of immigrants in a given geographical
region (e.g., nation, municipality) is one of the most studied
intergroup context features shaping attitudes toward immi-
grants. Theories hold conflicting assumptions on the effect
of the presence of ethnic and immigrant minorities. While
ethnic competition theory predicts that large proportions
of minorities elicit perceived competition and exclusionary
attitudes in a host society (Scheepers, Gijsberts, &
Coenders, 2002; see also Blalock, 1967), intergroup contact
theory, in turn, claims that a large minority proportion facil-
itates intergroup contact, thereby improving outgroup atti-
tudes (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The beneficial effect of
contact has especially been evidenced in small-scale con-
texts where a large proportion of immigrants reflects actual
interaction opportunities that are likely to reduce perceived
threat (e.g., Wagner et al., 2008). Moreover, beyond indi-
viduals’ contacts with immigrants, frequent exposure to
immigrant minorities may translate into more positive atti-
tudes toward immigrants through familiarization with
immigrants and their integration (Schneider, 2008).
These effects have also been studied with the proportion
of Muslims. Muslim proportion on the national level was
unrelated to exclusionary attitudes (Strabac & Listhaug,
2008). On a smaller scale, however, a large proportion of
Muslims has been shown to elicit more frequent interac-
tions, familiarization as well as increased threat perceptions
(across Swiss municipalities: Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin,
2010; across Dutch regions: Savelkoul, Scheepers, Tolsma,
& Hagendoorn, 2011), calling for a more thorough
investigation.
Interplay Between Conservative
Ideologies and Minority Proportion
Ideologies provide a promising avenue for understanding
how the proportion of ethnic and immigrant minorities
shapes exclusionary attitudes (Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin,
2013). Because individuals and communities with conser-
vative ideologies fundamentally differ in their values and
beliefs from individuals and communities low on conser-
vatism (Jost et al., 2003), they are also likely to react dif-
ferently to the presence of ethnic and immigrant
minorities.
1 Conservative ideologies are often divided into two core dimensions, one labeled social conservatism, authoritarianism, or traditionalism
versus autonomy and liberalism, and the other labeled economic conservatism, power, and hierarchy versus egalitarianism and social
welfare (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Jost et al., 2003). While the values underlying the second dimension also relate to anti-veil attitudes
(Saroglou et al., 2009; van der Noll, 2013), in this study, we chose to focus on the ﬁrst dimension since it has been shown to be most
strongly inﬂuenced by the intergroup context (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Roccas & Amit, 2011).
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Individuals endorsing conservative ideologies have been
shown to react with more exclusionary attitudes toward
immigrants when exposed to a large number of such minor-
ities (Sibley et al., 2013; see also Roccas & Amit, 2011).
Especially when immigrants are perceived as undermining
ingroup cohesion and threatening social order, exclusionary
attitudes are enhanced in conservative individuals (e.g.,
right-wing authoritarians; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Cohrs
& Stelzl, 2010; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). Con-
servative individuals also avoid interactions with immi-
grants, and their attitudes are therefore less often
improved by positive intergroup contact (Pettigrew, Christ,
Wagner, & Stellmacher, 2007; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995).
Similar patterns can be expected for the community level.
Notably, where conservative ideological climates prevail
and public debates fuel threat, a high proportion of ethnic
and immigrant minorities may elicit exclusion (Hopkins,
2010). Further, in culturally diverse contexts marked by
strong intergroup anxiety, positive intergroup interactions
are generally avoided (Halperin et al., 2012). However,
there is also evidence that conservative ideological climates
result in exclusionary attitudes (Schlueter & Davidov,
2013) and little intergroup contact (Sarrasin et al., 2012)
especially in homogenous contexts with few interaction
opportunities.
Because their motivations are compatible with a high
proportion of immigrants, individuals low on conservatism,
in turn, should not react with exclusionary attitudes toward
cultural and ethnic minorities. Indeed, individuals low on
conservative values have been shown to express more tol-
erant and inclusive attitudes toward immigrants (i.e., asy-
lum seekers) when cultural diversity was salient (Roccas
& Amit, 2011, Study 3). Moreover, individuals low on con-
servative values have been shown to readily engage in
intergroup contacts when intergroup interaction opportuni-
ties were available, thereby further improving their out-
group attitudes (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). On the
community level, progressive and tolerant norms, customs,
laws, and authority support have been suggested as central
conditions for reducing exclusionary attitudes in culturally
diverse societies (Allport, 1954; Blumer, 1958).
In summary, prior research indicates that individuals
and communities varying in their endorsement of conserva-
tive ideologies react differently to the presence of ethnic
and immigrant minorities. This is likely to further polarize
their attitudes toward immigrants: While a high minority
proportion should foster exclusionary attitudes in conserva-
tive individuals and communities, it should entail more tol-
erant attitudes in individuals and communities low on
conservative ideologies.
The Current Study
The current study examines how viewing the Muslim veil
as an obstacle to naturalization in Switzerland relates
to individual- and municipality-level conservative ideolo-
gies and minority proportion. Minority proportion in
municipalities is assessed with the proportion of the
largest Muslim immigrant groups in Switzerland, immi-
grants from former Yugoslav countries (e.g., Kosovo,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia) and Turkey. Though not
all immigrants from these countries are Muslims, they are
most strongly associated with Muslims by the Swiss popu-
lation (Helbling, 2010b; Stolz, 2005).
Swiss survey research shows that attitudes toward
Muslims have become more negative over the last
decade (Helbling, 2010a). This trend is likely to be
reflected in attitudes toward the naturalization of Muslim
immigrants. In Switzerland where naturalization decisions
are made on the municipality level, Muslims are more
frequently denied citizenship than other immigrant groups
(Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013). To date, only 12% of
the Muslim population living in Switzerland possess citi-
zenship, despite many of them being born and raised in
the country (Helbling, 2010a). This study thus examines
when the veil – often perceived as a refusal to assimilate
– is viewed as an obstacle to naturalization.
To sum up our predictions, on the individual level, we
hypothesize that perceiving the Muslim veil as an obstacle
to naturalization (hereafter anti-veil attitudes) is related to
different facets of conservative ideologies (i.e., security,
conformity, tradition values; H1). Among these facets,
security should be most strongly related to anti-veil atti-
tudes (Saroglou et al., 2009). Moreover, after accounting
for individual-level ideologies and socio-demographic fac-
tors, anti-veil attitudes should be stronger in municipalities
with conservative rather than progressive ideological cli-
mates (H2). Given the mixed findings in previous research
on the proportion of ethnic and immigrant minorities, no
hypothesis is formulated on the direct impact of the propor-
tion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks on anti-veil attitudes. How-
ever, we expect a high proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and
Turks in a municipality to intensify the link between con-
servative ideologies and anti-veil attitudes. In conservative
communities (H3a) and for conservative individuals (H4a),
anti-veil attitudes should be stronger when the proportion of
ex-Yugoslavs and Turks is high rather than low. In progres-
sive communities (H3b) and for low conservative individu-
als (H4b), attitudes toward the veil should be more positive
in municipalities with a high rather than low proportion.
As the veil is a salient feature of Muslim religious mem-
bership, exclusion based on the Muslim veil, or other reli-
gious symbols, may be driven by antireligious stances
(Fetzer & Soper, 2012; Saroglou et al., 2009). We thus also
examine the impact of religious affiliation and importance
of religion.
Method
Data Set and Sample
We analyzed Swiss citizens’ data from the 2005 wave of
the World Values Survey (WVS; data collected in 2007
in Switzerland). Respondents who declared themselves
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Muslims (N = 6) were excluded. In order to keep a stable
sample size across analyses, the sample was further reduced
by excluding individuals with missing data on dependent
and independent variables.2 The final sample (age:
M = 52.73, SD = 15.99; 44.7% male) included 1,006 indi-
viduals living in 125 municipalities (M = 8.94 individuals
per municipality, SD = 4.87, ranging from 1 [nine munici-
palities] to 32 [one municipality] individuals per
municipality).
Individual-Level Variables
Anti-veil attitudes were assessed with one item asking
whether the veil was viewed as an obstacle to naturalization
on a 4-point scale from 1 = not a problem to 4 = a big
problem. To ensure the estimation of precise covariance
estimates that is necessary to compute simple slopes, the
range of the scale was linearly transformed to vary between
0 and 100 (M = 55.24, SD = 31.97).
As various facets of conservative ideologies, confor-
mity, tradition, and security values were assessed by one
item each included in the 10-item Schwartz Value Scale,
a shorter version of the original 40-item Portrait Values
Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001). The items were for-
mulated as a portrait of the aspirations and wishes of a gen-
der-matched individual, and the respondent indicated if this
person was 1 = very much to 6 = not at all like him/her.
Items were reversed so that a high score indicated strong
adherence (conformity: M = 4.04, SD = 1.45; tradition:
M = 3.78, SD = 1.48; security: M = 3.43, SD = 1.42).3
These measures of conservative ideologies were
standardized.
We controlled for the following individual characteris-
tics: age, gender (1 = male), education (University/techni-
cal school, reference category, 25.7%, compared to no/
obligatory education, 7.6%, lower vocational education,
35.6%, and higher vocational education, 31.1%.), country
of birth (1 = born in Switzerland, 88.9%), political orienta-
tion (from 1 = left to 10 = right; M = 5.22, SD = 1.96),
income (from 1 = lowest tenth of salaries to 10 = upper
tenth of salaries;M = 5.37, SD = 1.87), importance of reli-
gion (recoded from 1 = not at all important to 4 = very
important; M = 2.39, SD = 1.01), and religious affiliation
(no religious affiliation, reference category, compared to
Christian, 77.3%, and other religious affiliation, 3.8%).
Continuous individual-level control variables were only
weakly related to each other (correlations ranged from
.02 to .23). All continuous control variables were
standardized.
Municipality-Level Predictors
Conservative ideological climate was operationalized
through referendum results from 1995 to 2006. The original
dataset, for all Swiss municipalities (Hermann, 2006), con-
tained nine thematic scores, of which three (foreign policy,
changes in government, social liberalization) were
extracted by a municipality-level factor analysis (a = .95;
see Sarrasin et al., 2012) and used to create the measure
of conservative climate. Municipalities ranged from
12.30 (most progressive) to 22.77 (most conservative),
with a mean of 0.35 (SD = 7.26, the overall Swiss
mean = 0).
Minority proportion was measured using the proportion
of the largest Muslim immigrant groups in Switzerland,
immigrants from former Yugoslav countries (e.g., Kosovo,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia) and Turkey. The propor-
tion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks ranged from 0% to 19.40%
(M = 4.68, SD = 3.95; Source: SFSO, 2000 census). Pro-
portion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks was unrelated to conser-
vative ideological climate (r = .13, p = .14). Finally,
urbanization was controlled for (1 = urban, 79.2%). The
proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks was higher in urban
municipalities (M = 5.24, SD = 4.06) compared to rural
municipalities (M = 2.67, SD = 2.67), t(123) = 3.19,
p = .002. No difference was found for conservative ideo-
logical climates in urban (M = 0.59, SD = 7.16) com-
pared to rural municipalities (M = 0.56, SD = 7.73),
t(123) = 0.72, p = .47. Continuous municipality-level pre-
dictors were standardized.
Results
Due to data being structured on two levels with individuals
(level 1) nested within municipalities (level 2), we per-
formed multilevel regression analyses (e.g., Hox, 2010),
with Mplus 5.1 using maximum likelihood estimation
with robust standard errors (MLR, Muthn & Muthn,
1998-2009). Anti-veil attitudes varied across municipalities
(r2 = 54.99, SE = 19.55, p = .005; ICC = 5.3%), indicat-
ing that a significant part of the total variance was a result
of this clustering structure.
To examine the improvement of the model fit, we cal-
culated the difference in deviance (2*loglikelihood; cor-
rected with the scaling factor necessary for MLR
estimations) between nested steps in the model building
process (see bottom line of Table 1). All individual-level
variables were entered in Model 1, Dv2(14) = 86.20,
2 Due to a large number of missing values for income (10.54%) and political orientation (9.17%), data on these sensitive questions was
imputed based on variables known to cause nonresponse for these questions (i.e., gender, age, education, and country of birth) using the
Stata Uvis command (Royston, 2005).
3 Different facets of conservative ideologies are treated separately for conceptual reasons (Saroglou et al., 2009; Schwartz, 1992). Moreover,
low reliability (a = .53) did not warrant a higher order value (i.e., conservation).
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p < .001. Adding level 2 predictors in Model 2 did not
improve model fit, Dv2(3) = 5.25, p = .15, yet the model
fit was significantly improved when the level 2 interaction
(Conservative Climatemunicipality-level · Proportion of Ex-
Yugoslavs & Turksmunicipality-level) was included (Model 3
compared to Model 1; Dv2(4) = 17.78, p = .001). Allowing
the relationship between conformity and anti-veil
attitudes to vary across municipalities in Model 4a
improved the model fit, Dv2(1) = 223.78, p < .001. Finally,
the cross-level interaction introduced in Model 4b
(Conformityindividual-level · Proportion of Ex-Yugoslavs &
Turksmunicipality-level) further improved the model fit,
Dv2(2) = 6.82, p = .03.
Individual-Level Effects
The results of the multilevel regression analyses are dis-
played in Table 1, from which socio-demographics and
municipality control variables were omitted for the sake
of readability. Findings of Model 1 partially confirmed
our hypothesis (H1): Of the three facets of conservative
ideologies, security was significantly and positively
related to anti-veil attitudes. Tradition and conformity
were also positively, though marginally related to anti-veil
attitudes.
Moreover, in line with previous research on anti-veil
attitudes and antireligious stances (Saroglou et al., 2009),
individuals attributing low importance to religion displayed
stronger anti-veil attitudes (b = 2.78, SE = 0.99,
p = .005). Stronger anti-veil attitudes were also found for
older people (b = 2.24, SE = 1.07, p = .04), with a right-
wing orientation (b = 5.30, SE = 1.18, p < .001), and with
a vocational education compared to university/technical
education (lower vocational education: b = 7.10,
SE = 2.45, p = .004; higher vocational education:
b = 6.57, SE = 2.46, p = .007). Individuals with no/obliga-
tory education did not differ in their anti-veil attitudes from
the reference category (i.e., university/technical education).
Furthermore, religious affiliation, gender, income, and
being born in Switzerland had no significant effect on
anti-veil attitudes.
Municipality-Level Effects
After controlling for individual-level effects and urbaniza-
tion, in line with H2 (see Model 2 in Table 1), conservative
ideological climate was positively, though marginally,
related to anti-veil attitudes. A high proportion of ex-Yugo-
slavs and Turks was negatively, though also marginally,
related with anti-veil attitudes, while urbanization was
Table 1. Unstandardized multilevel regression coefficients and standard errors for individual- and municipality-level
predictors of anti-veil attitudes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4b
Individual-level
predictors
Individual- and
municipality-level
predictors
Municipality-level
interaction
Cross-level
interaction
Intercept 52.06 (4.96)*** 53.22 (5.44)*** 52.77 (5.31)*** 51.43 (5.39)***
Individual-level predictors
Security 2.88 (1.11)** 2.71 (1.11)* 2.78 (1.10)* 2.87 (1.07)**
Tradition 2.21 (1.27) 2.07 (1.27) 2.12 (1.24) 2.26 (1.24)
Conformity 2.38 (1.41) 2.47 (1.41) 2.48 (1.41) 7.22 (2.71)**
Municipality-level predictors
Proportion of ex-Yugoslavs/Turks 2.23 (1.32) 2.74 (1.10)* 2.77 (1.11)*
Conservative climate 1.81 (1.10) 2.51 (1.04)* 2.51 (1.04)*
Proportion of ex-Yugoslavs/Turks
· Conservative Climate
4.57 (1.09)*** 4.52 (1.09)***
Cross-level interaction terms
Proportion of ex-Yugoslavs/Turks
· Conformity
2.73 (1.08)*
Variance components
Individual-level 888.39***
(% explained) (8.0%)
Municipality-level 38.68* 30.04 12.90
(% explained) (29.7%) (45.4%) (76.5%)
Random slope (conformity) 24.22
(% explained) (28.1%)
Deviancea 9,721.70 9,716.00 9,704.28 9,693.80b
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Controlled for age, gender, education, income, political orientation, importance of religion,
religious affiliation, country of birth, and urbanization. a2 · Loglikelihood. bDeviance of random slope model (Model 4a) is
9,700.26. p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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unrelated to anti-veil attitudes. Recall that as adding munic-
ipality-level main effects in Model 2 did not significantly
improve model fit, these results are merely indicative.
In Model 3, the interaction term between conservative
ideological climate and proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and
Turks yielded a significant effect.4 To interpret this finding,
the interaction was decomposed using simple slope analy-
ses (Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). Figure 1 illustrates
how for municipalities with a high proportion of ex-Yugo-
slavs and Turks (M + 1 SD), conservative ideological cli-
mate was positively related to anti-veil attitudes
(b = 7.07, SE = 1.50, p < .001). In municipalities charac-
terized by low proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks
(M  1 SD), conservative ideological climate was unre-
lated to anti-veil attitudes (b = 2.06, SE = 1.50,
p = .17). To assess our predictions for municipalities with
conservative versus progressive ideological climates, we
further decomposed the interaction. Unexpectedly, for
municipalities with conservative ideological climates
(M + 1 SD), anti-veil attitudes did not increase when pro-
portion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks was high compared to
low (b = 1.83, SE = 1.45, p = .21). However, when the
most conservative municipalities were examined (M + 2
SD), our hypothesis (H3a) received support and anti-veil
attitudes were increased when the proportion of ex-Yugo-
slavs and Turks was high rather than low (b = 6.39,
SE = 2.33, p = .006). Finally, in line with our expectations
(H3b), in progressive ideological climates (M  1 SD)
anti-veil attitudes were attenuated when the proportion of
ex-Yugoslavs and Turks was high compared to low
(b = 7.31, SE = 1.63, p < .001).
Cross-Level Interaction
To test whether the link between the different facets of con-
servative ideologies (i.e., conformity, tradition, and secu-
rity) and anti-veil attitudes varied across municipalities, in
unpresented analyses, we allowed for the slopes between
these variables to vary. To remove municipality-level vari-
ation in individual-level predictors, individual-level predic-
tors involved in cross-level interactions were centered at the
municipality mean (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). Only the
slope between conformity and anti-veil attitudes varied sig-
nificantly across municipalities (r2 = 33.69, SE = 15.76,
p = .03).5 Cross-level interactions (Model 4b in Table 1)
revealed that proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks signif-
icantly predicted the variation between conformity and anti-
veil attitudes.6 As shown in Figure 2, in municipalities with
a high proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks (M + 1 SD),
conformity was positively related to anti-veil attitudes
(b = 9.95, SE = 3.21, p = .002). In municipalities with a
low proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks (M  1 SD),
conformity was only marginally related to anti-veil atti-
tudes (b = 4.49, SE = 2.60, p = .08). Against our expecta-
tions (H4a), individuals high in conformity (M + 1 SD) did
not express accentuated anti-veil attitudes when the propor-
tion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks in their municipalities was
high rather than low (b = 0.04, SE = 1.66, p = .98).
Figure 1. Municipality-level interaction between conser-
vative ideological climate and proportion of Ex-Yugo-
slavs and Turks.
Figure 2. Cross-level interaction between conformity and
proportion of Ex-Yugoslavs and Turks.
4 The preliminary analyses were also carried out including urbanization in interaction terms. While the main ﬁndings remained signiﬁcant,
neither of the added interaction terms reached signiﬁcance.
5 After preliminary analyses revealed no signiﬁcant covariance between intercept and slope, it was set to 0.
6 Urbanization yielded a marginal effect on the conformity-anti-veil attitudes slope.
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Individuals low in conformity (M  1 SD), in turn,
expressed more positive attitudes toward the veil when
the proportion of Ex-Yugoslavs and Turks was high com-
pared to low (b = 5.50, SE = 1.43, p < .001), thereby
confirming our assumptions (H4b).7
Discussion
The present research across Swiss municipalities contrib-
utes to uncovering how individual- and community-level
conservative ideologies and minority proportion (here mea-
sured with the proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks in a
municipality) jointly influence host society members’ views
on the Muslim veil as an obstacle to naturalization. While
security was the facet of conservative ideologies most
strongly related to anti-veil attitudes, tradition was margin-
ally related to anti-veil attitudes. Conformity was also
linked to anti-veil attitudes, but mainly in contexts with a
high minority proportion. Similarly, community-level con-
servative climate increased anti-veil attitudes in contexts
with a high minority proportion. Our findings confirmed
that a high minority proportion polarized attitudes among
individuals and communities: Anti-veil attitudes increased
in conservative communities when minority proportion
was high rather than low, whereas in such contexts, atti-
tudes were more tolerant among nonconformist individuals
and in progressive communities.
Our findings support previous research suggesting that
due to a frequent association between Muslims and terror-
ism in the media and in public discourse, security concerns
effectively spur anti-veil attitudes (Saroglou et al., 2009;
van der Noll, 2013). Tradition and conformity may have
triggered anti-veil attitudes because the veil elicited concern
that Muslims undermine these values. On the contrary, our
findings did not suggest that tradition elicited feelings of
sympathy for a group struggling to uphold their own tradi-
tions (see Saroglou et al., 2009). Our findings are likely to
be due to our measure tapping opposition to naturalization.
Because naturalization implies granting ingroup member-
ship status, individuals valuing tradition and conformity,
in particular, may expect that naturalization candidates
strictly comply with ingroup norms.
Unexpectedly, only the link between conformity and
anti-veil attitudes was shaped by the minority proportion
in a municipality. Moreover, highly conformist individuals
did not express increased anti-veil attitudes when living in
contexts with a high rather than low minority proportion.
We can speculate on these findings in several ways. An
increased salience of the presence of immigrant minorities
in experimental settings may be more susceptible to trigger-
ing exclusionary attitudes, while long-term exposure to eth-
nic and immigrant minorities in natural environments is
likely to entail familiarization, attenuating an increase in
anti-veil attitudes in conservative individuals. Particularly
for individuals valuing conformity to social norms, living
in culturally diverse environments may paradoxically buffer
rather than enhance exclusionary attitudes (Sniderman &
Hagendoorn, 2007). Indeed, where the veil becomes a com-
mon feature of every-day life, conformists may not be more
opposed to the veil than in environments where the veil is
uncommon. Moreover, while conservative individuals (i.e.,
right-wing authoritarians) are likely to avoid intergroup
contact, they are also the ones most benefiting from the pre-
judice-attenuating effect of contact once it has been estab-
lished (Asbrock, Christ, Duckitt, & Sibley, 2012). Further
research is needed to clarify how the various facets of con-
servative ideologies relate to exclusionary attitudes in cul-
turally diverse societies.
It is worth shifting the lens from contexts with a high
proportion of ethnic and immigrant minorities to contexts
offering no or limited interaction opportunities: We found
that where interaction opportunities were sparse, the veil
was widely perceived as an obstacle to naturalization,
affecting first and foremost low conformists and municipal-
ities with progressive climates. These findings indicate that
where familiarization and direct intergroup encounters are
reduced, the larger political and public debate may gain
importance as a central source of information (Schlueter
& Davidov, 2013; Wagner et al., 2008). Indeed, in Switzer-
land, the public and political debate portraying Muslims as
conflicting with liberal and democratic values is likely to
foster exclusionary attitudes (Fetzer & Soper, 2013). It is
unsurprising that right-wing populist parties have blamed
Muslims for undermining these values to address voters
across the ideological spectrum and mobilize individuals
generally least likely to adopt exclusionary stances (Snider-
man & Hagendoorn, 2007; Verkuyten, 2013). Our study
suggests that not only individuals, but also communities
can be brought to adopt exclusionary stances when no
opportunities are available to revise the threatening images
suggested by media and political campaigns.
Some limitations of our research need to be addressed.
Our findings are based on correlational data, impeding firm
causal claims. While theory predicts that more abstract
motivational constructs (e.g., ideologies) generally precede
attitudes toward concrete objects (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley,
2010), further research is needed to test these causal
assumptions. Moreover, our data does not allow accounting
for residential selection (Hopkins, 2010). Personal ideolo-
gies, among other determinants, may lead individuals to
7 To ensure the robustness of our ﬁndings, additional analyses were conducted including structural and sociocultural context variables
potentially impacting immigration attitudes (see Sarrasin et al., 2012). While attitudes towards the veil were more positive in German-
speaking than in French-speaking municipalities and in municipalities characterized by a low compared to high unemployment rate, other
municipality-level control variables (e.g., economic inequality, population size) had no effect. Importantly, predicted result patterns were
unaltered. Moreover, ﬁndings remained signiﬁcant when carried out on a reduced sample including a minimal number of individuals per
municipality (e.g., min. 7 individuals/municipality, N = 889, in N = 92 municipalities). Finally, results were not affected when municipality
outliers in proportion of ex-Yugoslavs and Turks (two municipalities) or conservative climates (one municipality) were replaced by the
cutoff value (M ± 3 SD).
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select certain environments, which may bias interpretations
of the impact of these environments. Further, it has been
argued that it is a high immigrant proportion together with
realized contacts that reduces prejudice by lowering threat
(Wagner et al., 2008). Because our dataset did not include
measures of actual intergroup contact, we were unable to
demonstrate a link between a high minority proportion
and realized contact. Thus, we cannot conclude whether
the interplay between minority proportion and conservative
ideologies was due to conservative ideologies hampering
engagement in intergroup contact, reducing the effective-
ness of intergroup contact, or even triggering negative inter-
group contact experiences.
Finally, opposition toward the naturalization of veiled
Muslims tapped anti-veil attitudes. Wearing the veil has
been associated with a refusal to assimilate to Western
norms and customs, most apprehended by individuals
endorsing conservative ideologies (i.e., right-wing authori-
tarians; Thomsen et al., 2008), but also by individuals with
antireligious stances (Saroglou et al., 2009). While our find-
ings suggest that such assimilationist concerns also underlie
opposition to the naturalization of veiled Muslims, opposi-
tion on these grounds may not necessarily coincide with a
general dislike of Muslims (e.g., van der Noll, 2013).
Yet, the context in which our study was conducted never-
theless speaks for a marked overlap. Unlike Belgium or
France, many Swiss cantons have not adopted strict secular
policies and religious symbols remain a common feature of
public space (e.g., the crucifix in public schools). Objecting
to the naturalization of Muslims based on a display of their
religious membership is thus likely to reflect discriminatory
and exclusionary stances (see Fetzer & Soper, 2012). This
further highlights that justifications of exclusion based on
religious symbols need to be considered in the context in
which they are expressed. Future studies would do well tak-
ing into account local and larger scale contexts, such as
national-level secularism or immigration policies.
Naturalization symbolically and legally includes immi-
grants into the national ingroup. Naturalized immigrants
develop a greater sense of belonging to the nation and
stronger national identification, which in turn improves
educational outcomes, economic prospects as well as inter-
group relations more generally (Verkuyten & Martinovic,
2012). Our study showed that the interplay between indi-
vidual- and community-level ideologies and minority pro-
portion needs to be studied to understand opposition to
naturalization of discriminated groups such as Muslims.
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